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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the efficiency in European banking organisations and the 
relation with corporate governance issues deriving from differences in ownership, 
bank type and financial structure. More specifically, we estimate the cost X-efficiency 
levels for a large sample of commercial, savings and co-operative banking institutions 
operating in the EU-15 (European Union) over 1998-2003 by using alternative 
parametric frontiers across bank- and market-based countries classified using the 
World Bank Financial Structure Database (Beck et al., 2001 and Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2001). In line with the main literature, it is found that cost X-inefficiencies are 
on average 23% and the Fourier-flexible should be the preferred functional form to 
model EU banks’ production processes. However, while non-listed commercial 
institutions appear less cost efficient than the listed ones, on the whole our results 
reject the agency theory hypothesis that managers of privately-owned banks are more 
cost efficient than those of mutual banking institutions because of capital market 
devices. In particular, we find that mutual banks operating in the EU-15 countries are 
significantly more cost efficient than the commercial banks included in our sample. 
Furthermore, results are mixed concerning the financial structure hypothesis that in 
developed financial systems bank efficiency should not be statistically different across 
bank- versus market-based economies. Specifically, we find that while the hypothesis 
seems to hold for the sub-sample of commercial banks, in bank-based countries 
savings banks have significant cost efficiency advantages over those operating in 
market-based ones and over commercial banks.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between firms’ ownership and efficiency is of great importance 
in the corporate governance literature (see Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Grossman and Hart, 1980; and Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
In the principal-agent framework, a major issue is what makes managers in different 
ownership types minimise production costs and maximise profits. For most European 
countries the banking sectors have traditionally been characterised by three main 
banks’ types namely commercial, savings and co-operatives. Each bank type is 
associated with well-defined ownership and control characteristics on banks’ 
operations. For instance, commercial banks can be either privately owned or listed; 
and co-operatives are typically mutual banks. While the legal form of saving banks 
clearly differs across countries (see sections 2 and 3.1), we analyse them as a single 
bank type as in Altunbas et al. (2003). Although the separation of ownership from 
control is common in all organisational forms, each ownership structure presents 
alternative property and contracting rights, thus each one imposes different 
restrictions on the “optimal” managerial behaviour. Agency theory postulates that 
managers of private institutions are forced to run their institutions efficiently and 
control their costs via market discipline devices; whereas managers in mutual 
institutions may not promote efficiency since capital market discipline devices are to 
some extent limited.
1
  
Over the last decade or so, the financial sector in Europe has witnessed a series 
of fundamental changes such as deregulation and financial and technological 
innovation that have forced banks to modify their strategic objectives. For example, 
banking institutions have responded to deregulation and greater competitive pressures 
with a privatisation and consolidation process. As a result, European banks’ managers 
have become increasingly demand-oriented and had to adjust their strategic goals 
towards cost reductions, profit and shareholder value maximisation (see, for example, 
                                                
1 If capital markets cannot provide the tools for diminishing the discretionary power of managers over 
firms’ property rights, then managers are left free to pursue their own interests and their incentives to 
increase firm’s efficiency are weak. For instance, the absence of a compensation package that links the 
managers’ income with the mutual banks’ performance makes managers of those banks more likely to 
maximise their own utility (see for instance O’Hara, 1981; and Masulis, 1987). In addition, other 
external corporate governance discipline devices such as board of directors’, creditors’ or shareholders’ 
monitoring have limited, if not any, power to minimise the agency costs associated with behaviour of 
managers of mutual banks (namely expense preference behaviour, self-selection of management 
quality, and choice of project risk, see e.g. Williams, 2004).    
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Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 2006). As part of these strategic changes many banks 
operating in different European countries have recently engaged in transforming their 
ownership structures and have converted into privately owned or listed companies, 
while the role of the national governments in the banking sector has decreased 
considerably.
2
  However, savings and co-operative banks still retain a relatively high 
market share in terms of total assets and deposits (around 15-20%) (see European 
Savings Banks Group, 2003 and European Association of Co-operative Banks, 2004).  
Although these credit institutions operating in Europe are usually smaller in terms of 
asset base compared with other banks’ types and operate locally rather than globally, 
they are able to enjoy relatively high profits (see European Savings Banks Group, 
2004).  
The proposed relationship in the literature is that private banks are more 
efficient than their mutual counterparts. The motivation of this hypothesis is the 
alliance of managers’ objectives and owners’ interest in each ownership form. 
Although managers of private banks are expected to be cost efficient through market 
devices, it is possible that environmental factors may force mutual banks’ managers to 
pursue the objective of high efficiency.
3
 Finally, it is rational to assume that in each 
ownership form the owners are concerned about cost efficiency (see, Altunbas et al., 
2001a); however, the same does not hold true for the management incentives in each 
ownership type. It might be that non-private banks’ managers have an advantage in 
keeping their banks safe and maintaining good relationship with their long-term 
customers; whereas private banks’ managers may be interested in providing additional 
or higher quality services that raise costs but also may drive up revenues by more than 
the cost increases (see Berger and Mester, 2003). From the above it is apparent that 
the private versus non-private ownership forms debate can only be resolved 
empirically. In this paper we compare the cost efficiency between commercial 
privately-owned and listed banks versus mutual banks.  
                                                
2
 For example, the process of demutualisation started in the UK with the conversion of building 
societies into banks and was later followed in other EU countries e.g. in Italy, Austria and France. Also 
the direct/indirect state involvement in Finnish, French, German, Greek and Irish banking institutions 
has been further reduced (see European Central Bank, 2002 and Chakravarty and Williams, 2006).  
3
 For instance Rasmusen (1988) shows that uninformed and risk-averse depositors prefer mutual banks 
because managers in these banks have a stronger incentive to choose a safe portfolio since their upside 
gains in compensation are limited by law and they risk losing their high lifetime income if their bank 
bankrupts. Similarly, Miles (1994) indicates that the owners of mutual banks, due to the right to 
withdraw their funds, can discipline inefficient management more effectively compared with private 
banks’ owners who can just sell their shares in secondary markets. 
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Another objective of this paper is to relate European banks’ efficiency with 
corporate governance issues deriving from differences in financial structure. This is 
because the effectiveness of a corporate governance system is also strongly related to 
the financial structure and development that prevails in a country. Indeed it is widely 
acknowledged in the corporate governance literature that a cross-country analysis is 
valid only if financial structure and financial development are controlled for (see 
Schmidt and Tyrell, 1997, and section 2). The related literature is vast; nonetheless, 
there is only one study that attempts to empirically investigate the relationship 
between financial structure and bank performance (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2001).   
This paper compares efficiency levels for a sample of 16,674 EU-15 bank 
observations over 1998-2003 estimated using alternative parametric cost frontiers, 
across different financial structures; namely bank- and market-based financial systems  
classified using the World Bank Financial Structure Database (Beck et al., 2001 and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). The paper first attempts to resolve one of the main 
problems in parametric analysis that is to determine which cost function imposes the 
best structure on the shape of the efficient frontier.  In particular, we test and compare 
the stochastic translog and linear spline against the Fourier-flexible cost frontier. Then 
we rearrange the data and estimate two frontier models: a common European and 
separate bank- and market based frontiers. The aim is to compare the cost X-
efficiencies across bank- and market- based EU countries for the different groups of 
commercial, savings and co-operative banks; and between listed and non-listed 
banking institutions in our sample. In addition, we attempt to determine potential 
implications for bank efficiency originating from differences in financial structure and 
investigate the relationship between efficiency, bank type, ownership and financial 
structure.  The ultimate goal is to identify the organisational and financial structures 
as important determinants of a sound corporate governance system in Europe. To the 
best of our knowledge there are no previous similar empirical works for the EU 
banking sector. Such a study has important policy implications especially in light of 
the fact that the EU banking sector is experiencing profound structural changes and a 
full integration has not yet been achieved (see Marquez-Ibanez and Molyneux, 2002, 
and Berger et al. 2001). 
The next section briefly reviews the main literature. Section 3 explains the data 
and the methodology used to classify the sampled countries according to the World 
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Bank Financial Structure Index and to calculate bank efficiency. Section 4 discusses 
the main findings. The last section concludes and outlines the main policy 
implications of the research.    
 
2. Literature review 
 
The banking literature on X-efficiencies calculated using various forms of 
parametric frontiers is copious both in the US and, to a lesser extent, in Europe (see 
for extensive reviews, Berger and Humphrey, 1997, and Goddard et al. 2001). 
Nonetheless only a few studies carry out a methodological cross-checking of the 
results obtained using alternative parametric frontier methods.  The advantages and 
disadvantages of using Fourier-flexible versus translog functional forms are well 
discussed in the literature (see Berger et al., 1997; Berger and Mester, 1997 and 
Altunbas and Chakravarty 2001); whereas only a handful of studies employ the linear 
spline function to estimate bank efficiencies in terms of scale and scope economies 
(see McAllister and McManus, 1993, for a US study and, more recently, Humphrey 
and Vale, 2004, for a study on Norwegian banks). 
Focusing on the European banking sector, there are several country-specific 
studies that investigate the efficiency of different bank ownership structures using 
both parametric and/or non-parametric frontier methods (for more details on the most 
popular frontier methods see for example Goddard et al., 2001).  Altunbas et al. 
(2001a) use the Fourier-flexible functional form to estimate cost and profit 
characteristics of the German banking market between 1989 and 1996. They estimate 
separate cost and alternative profit frontiers for each ownership type, namely private 
commercial, public savings and mutual co-operative banks; they also compare these 
results with those obtained from a sample combining all ownership forms. Their 
average cost inefficiency scores derived from the separate and the pooled stochastic 
frontier models (when off-balance sheet items are excluded) is 21.5% and 26.5% in 
commercial banks; 15.3% and 17.6% in savings banks; and 11.1% and 16.9% in 
mutual co-operative banks. Overall, their results do not find agency problems for non-
private banks and argue that this can be explained by either their lower cost of funding 
due to their small and retail customer business orientation or their power of exercising 
local monopolies and pricing uncompetitively for moral hazard reasons. Using 
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Spanish data, Hasan and Lozano-Vivas (2002) employ the Fourier-flexible stochastic 
cost frontier for each ownership structure separately and find that mutual savings 
banks are 8.6% more cost inefficient than commercial banks over 1986-1995. The 
authors interpret their findings as a deliberate strategy of savings banks’ managers to 
motivate employees to compete with commercial banks in the deregulated markets. 
Girardone et al. (2004) use a Fourier-flexible cost function to estimate cost X-
efficiency and scale economies for a sample of Italian banks by size and ownership 
type over 1993-96. They find that on average the best performing banks are the 
mutual banks; in 1996 the cost efficiency of credit co-operative banks was 88.2% and 
that of commercial banks was 83.2%. The authors explain these results by referring to 
the possible greater homogeneity of the co-operative banking sector and by the fact 
that small co-operative banks are more likely to exploit economies of scale and other 
efficiencies because of possible local monopolies.  
Only a handful of cross-country studies in Europe focus on the relation of bank 
efficiency and ownership. For instance, Carbo et al. (2002) investigates the case of 
European savings banks from 1989 to 1996 by employing a Fourier-flexible stochastic 
cost frontier approach. They find scale economies range between 7% and 10% while 
X-inefficiency scores reach a much higher 22%. They also distinguish between four 
different organisational models adopted by European savings banks, namely a ‘state’ 
model (e.g. Germany); a ‘mixed’ model (e.g. Spain); an ‘in-transition’ model (e.g. 
Finland); and a ‘marketised’ model (e.g. the UK). However, the authors do not seem 
to find any strong evidence that could suggest the superiority of any of these models 
in terms of either X-inefficiencies or economies of scale. Williams and Gardener 
(2003) also study the European saving banks over 1990-1998 by employing the 
Battese and Coelli (1995) model in which the level of firm inefficiency is determined 
by a vector of environmental and firm-specific variables. They find that the savings 
banks operating under a ‘foundations’ structure (Germany and France) are more cost 
efficient than those organised under the ‘association’ (Denmark and UK) and ‘mixed’ 
(Italy and Spain) models. Altunbas et al. (2003) investigate whether systematic 
efficiency differences can occur between a large sample of commercial, savings and 
co-operative banks in the US and Europe during the 1990s by employing a translog 
stochastic frontier approach. As far as we are aware, their’s is the only study to 
examine the relationship between efficiency and ownership structure in a European 
cross-country framework. Overall, they find that commercial banks are less cost but 
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more profit efficient compared with mutual banks. Their cost inefficiency estimates 
ranges between 23.1%-37% for commercial banks; 17.8%-34.9% for savings banks; 
and 13.8%-36% for co-operative banks (based on the pooled ownership frontier 
estimations). According to the authors their findings can be explained by the fact that 
commercial banks offer a diverse business mix, higher quality services and better risk 
management procedures compared to other banks types that may increase costs but 
also generate higher revenues. However, they cannot exclude the possibility that 
commercial banks may, in some cases, exert market power.  
Overall, the empirical evidence on bank efficiency and ownership structure 
seems to indicate that the proposed ownership hypothesis that private banks are more 
efficient than their non-private counterparts does not always hold true for European 
banks. This paper attempts to contribute to this mixed evidence of the agency theory 
by estimating cost efficiency measures for large samples of commercial, savings and 
co-operative banks in Europe over recent years and also distinguishing between 
commercial listed and non-listed banking institutions. 
As discussed above, the effectiveness of a corporate governance system is also 
strongly related to the financial structure and development that prevails in a given 
country. Indeed it is acknowledged in the corporate governance literature that a cross-
country analysis is valid only if financial structure and financial development are 
controlled for (see Schmidt and Tyrell, 1997, for the different role of banks and 
market in the context of corporate governance; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, for a 
survey in corporate governance; as well as Cernat, 2004, for the major constraints on 
convergence of national corporate governance systems in Europe).
4
 The deadlock of 
the bank- versus market-based systems debate (see Goldsmith, 1969, Vogel, 1979, 
and Porter, 1992) made researchers turn their interest to alternative views of financial 
structure and economic development. For instance, the financial services view 
proposed by Levine (1997) posits that the main concern for the efficient allocation of 
resources and economic growth should be to create an environment in which banks 
and markets provide “sound” financial services. Similarly, the law and finance view 
by La Porta et al. (1998) is a special case of Levine’s (1997) financial services view 
that demonstrates that the legal system has a significant role in determining the overall 
                                                
4 However, recently Allen et al. (2005) have pointed out that although the traditional classification into 
bank- and market-based might become less applicable due to the increased importance of pan-
European developments in financial services such as the Euronext, it is still very useful as it 
summarises the main characteristics of a financial system.  
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level and quality of financial services. Therefore, based on these two views our 
proposed hypothesis is that after controlling for the level of financial development, 
financial structure does not have any independent effect on bank efficiency.  
The literature focusing on financial systems’ structure and development is vast; 
however, as far as we are aware there are no studies that attempt to directly associate 
the financial structure with efficiency and ownership in banking. To date we found 
only one study that focuses on the relationship between financial structure and bank 
performance by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001). The authors present evidence 
on the impact of financial development and structure on bank performance for a 
sample that covers 44 developed and underdeveloped countries over 1990-1997. 
Based on the World Bank Financial Structure Index (see Section 3.1) they classify 
UK, Sweden, and Denmark as market-based economies and Austria, Belgium, France, 
Greece, Ireland, and Italy as bank-based economies. Overall, their results provide 
evidence that after controlling for the level of financial development, financial 
structure does not have an independent effect on bank profitability as they find that in 
developed financial systems bank profits and margins are not statistically different 
across bank-based and market-based systems.  
None of the above studies directly link banking efficiency with different bank 
types and financial structures in Europe. To address these issues, the countries in our 
sample have been classified into bank-based and market-based using the World Bank 
Financial Structure database (Section 3.1). Then, the cost efficiency estimates are 
derived based on alternative stochastic cost frontiers which are explained in Section 
3.2. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Banks’ inputs and outputs and the World Bank Financial Structure Index 
 
The data used for the cost frontier estimations are drawn from BankScope, an 
international London-based database. The sample comprises 4,177 commercial (of 
which 645 are listed), 4,656 savings, and 7,842 mutual co-operative bank observations 
across 15 European countries over 1998-2003 (see Table 1).  
In our sample, commercial banks can be either privately owned or listed 
companies. Although the co-operative banks are all mutual, the savings banks sample 
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is heterogeneous in terms of legal status across European countries as pointed out 
among others by Carbo et al. (2002) and Williams (2004). For example, in France 
savings banks are organised as non-profit entities owned by their customers; in 
Germany they are mainly government-owned; in Italy they have a joint-stock 
ownership structure but are effectively owned by private foundations that have non-
profit objectives. In the UK, a substantial volume of total assets of the savings banks 
sector has been converted and the remaining building societies maintain the mutual 
legal status.
5
  
 
Table 1 EU-15 Commercial, Savings and Co-operative Bank Observations (1998-
2003) 
 
Country Commercial Banks Savings Banks Co-operative Banks Total 
Austria 192 372 168 732 
Belgium 114 48 48 210 
Denmark 300 180 n.a. 480 
Finlanda 20 n.a. 10 30 
France 738 156 372 1,266 
Germany 876 2,964 4,668 8,508 
Greece 61 n.a. n.a. 60 
Ireland 42 n.a. n.a. 42 
Italy 522 312 2,550 3,384 
Luxembourg 450 n.a. n.a. 450 
Netherlands 60 n.a. n.a. 60 
Portugal 72 n.a. n.a. 72 
Spain 354 282 36 672 
Sweden 36 24 n.a. 60 
UK 360 318 n.a. 678 
Total 4,177 4,656 7,842 16,674 
 “n.a.”= not available because that particular type of banking institution either does not exist in that 
particular country or there are not enough observations to estimate country- and ownership-specific 
frontier models (see section 3.2). 
a
 Due to the significantly low number of observations we could not estimate the country-specific 
frontier for Finland; thus it is not included in our data sample. 
Source: Bankscope (2005). 
 
Regardless of their diverse business structures and legal forms, savings banks in 
Europe have common objectives such as the focus on local regions and the 
maximisation of social welfare (see Gardener et al., 1997 and 1999; European Savings 
Bank Group, 2004 and Williams 2004 for details on the savings banks sector in the 
EU; and Casu et al., 2006 for an evaluation of the main features of the European 
                                                
5
 Following Williams (2004) in this paper we consider the building societies operating in the UK as 
savings banks.   
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banking system).
6
 Therefore as in Altunbas et al. (2003) we analyse them as a single 
bank type.
7
 
Concerning the input-output definition, we use the intermediation approach 
originally developed by Sealey and Lindley (1977) which posits that total loans and 
securities are outputs, whereas deposits along with labour and physical capital are 
inputs (see Table A1 in the Appendix for a detailed description). Given the 
heterogeneity of our sample we are looking at efficiency in traditional intermediation 
business since many mutual banking institutions do not report off-balance sheet 
activities. 
As noted above, one of the aims of this paper is to examine the link between the 
financial structure and banking efficiency. Despite the fact that there is not any widely 
accepted measure that determines whether the financial system of a country is bank- 
or market-based, one of the most common used method in the recent literature is the 
conglomerate index of financial structure defined by Beck et al. (2001) and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001).   
The financial structure index quantifies the degree of stock market orientation of 
a financial system. It is based on the means-removed average of relative ‘size’, 
‘activity’ and ‘efficiency’ of the stock market and banking sub-sectors of the financial 
system in each country. Relative ‘size’ is defined as the ratio of the stock market 
capitalisation to total assets of deposit money banks; relative ‘activity’ is defined as 
the total value of stocks traded divided by bank credit to the private sector; and 
relative ‘efficiency’ is defined as the product of total value of stocks traded and the 
ratio of average overhead cost to total assets of banks in the country. (See Beck et al., 
2001, for a description and intuition behind these variables and also refer to the notes 
to Table A2). Then from each individual value of the relative ‘size’, ‘activity’ and 
‘efficiency’ series we subtract the mean to obtain the means-removed values and 
finally we take the average of these values to obtain the means-removed average. 
We use aggregate data of 54 countries obtained by the World Bank Financial 
structure database
8
 over the period 1998-2003 which coincides with the period for 
                                                
6
 As recently emphasised by The Banker (2006), European savings banks provide “a locally focused, 
decentralised bank model offering ‘proximity banking’ to customers via the use of branches as the 
main distribution channels”. 
7
 Note that we do not include listed savings banks in our sample; thus, saving banks are generally 
referred as mutual to denote that are non-listed banks, (see Gardener et al., 1999). Altunbas et al. 
(2007) denote that the European savings sector has mutual/quasi public ownership.   
8 See http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/ 
 11 
which we estimate banks’ efficiency. Countries with values of the Financial Structure 
Index above (below) the sample mean are classified as market-based (bank-based) 
(see Table A2 in the Appendix). In order to control for financial development
9
 we 
group the 54 countries in our sample into a) developed bank-based; b) developed 
market-based; and c) underdeveloped (see Table A2 in the Appendix and Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine, 2001, p. 21 for more details). Table 2 reports the financial structure 
measures for the EU-15 countries only. 
 
Table 2 Country classification of Financial Structure and Development for Our 
Sample of EU countries (1998-2003) 
 
Country Name Relative 
Size 
Relative 
Activity 
Relative 
Efficiency 
Structure 
Austria -0.869 -0.646 -0.014 -0.510 
Belgium -0.418 -0.465 -0.011 -0.298 
Denmark -0.457 -0.283 -0.001 -0.247 
Germany -0.630 -0.243 0.004 -0.290 
Ireland -0.354 -0.364 -0.012 -0.244 
Italy -0.430 -0.003 0.007 -0.142 
France -0.203 0.047 0.009 -0.049 
Greece -0.099 0.327 0.003 0.077 
Luxembourg 0.320 -0.662 -0.015 -0.119 
Netherlands -0.115 0.343 0.017 0.081 
Portugal -0.643 -0.502 -0.010 -0.385 
Spain -0.373 0.742 0.028 0.132 
Sweden 0.553 0.976 0.011 0.513 
United Kingdom 0.239 0.255 0.027 0.174 
Source: World Bank Financial Structure database, http://www.worldbank.org. See table A2 for more details.   
  
 
Sweden, United Kingdom, Spain, Netherlands and Greece
10
 (countries with 
the highest values of structure index) are defined as market-based and the rest as 
bank-based (see Table A2 for the classification of the full sample of the 54 countries 
used). For robustness, we apply the financial structure analysis to the dataset 
                                                
9
 According to Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) a financial system is defined as ‘underdeveloped’ 
when both bank credit/GDP and total value of the stock traded/GDP are below the sample mean. 
10 By using this method two traditionally bank-based countries, namely Greece and Spain, are classified 
as market-based. This could be explained by the fact that in the period under investigation these two 
countries had a significantly ‘active’ and ‘efficient’ stock market as reflected in the high relative 
‘activity’ and ‘efficiency’ indicators. Allen et al. (2005) also find that Spain has very large stock market 
(as defined by the number of listed companies) over 1995-2004; this is mostly due to the fact that since 
1999 the market segment of the Spanish stock exchange dedicated to Latin America (Latibex) has risen 
a lot.  However, in order to account for the fact that this may be a temporary effect we estimated our 
frontier with and without the inclusion of these two countries for both the bank- and market based- 
groups. 
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comprised by the 15 European countries and we also develop alternative measures of 
financial structure. The main results do not change significantly.
11
 
 
3.2 Estimating bank efficiency 
 
In this paper we specify alternative frontier models, namely the translog; linear 
spline and Fourier-flexible functional forms, to analyse cost X-efficiency levels across 
EU-15 countries using the Battese and Coelli’s (1992) time-varying stochastic frontier 
models. To derive our efficiency estimates, we first pool our total sample of banks for 
all countries and derive average efficiency scores based on a common European 
frontier. Then, we use the World Bank Financial Structure Index described in Section 
3.1 and re-estimate two separate frontiers for bank- and market-based countries to 
minimise criticisms associated with potential differences in underlying technology 
between banking sectors in different financial structures when estimating the pan-
European frontier. Finally, we cross-check the alternative common frontier results 
with those derived from country-specific frontiers.
12
   
X-efficiency scores are estimated using the Battese and Coelli’s (1992) time-
varying stochastic frontier approach. The single-equation stochastic cost model is 
represented by itititit BPQTCTC ε+= );,(lnln
*  and ititit vu +=ε  with i=1,…,N and 
t=1,…,T denoting the banks and years indices, respectively. The terms ln itTC and 
*lnTC are the natural logarithms of the observed and optimal total cost; ln itQ and 
ln itP  are the vectors of the natural logarithms of output quantities and input prices; B 
is the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; 
itv is a two-sided error term 
capturing the effects of statistical noise, assumed to be independently and identically 
normal distributed with zero mean and variance 2vσ  and independent of the 
)]}(exp[{ Ttnuu iit −−= where iu is a one-sided error term capturing the effects of 
inefficiency and assumed to be half normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
                                                
11
 In particular we used the first principal component of relative ‘size’, relative ‘activity’ and relative 
‘efficiency’. In addition, we used the ratio of stock market capitalisation to bank credit to define the 
relative ‘size’ and the product of stock market turnover ratio and overhead cost to define relative 
‘efficiency’ (see Levine, 2002). The estimates are available from the authors on request.   
12
 These results are available from the authors; however, they do not differ significantly from those 
reported in this paper. 
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2
uσ
13
; n is an unknown parameter to be estimated capturing the effect of inefficiency 
change over time.
14
  
Moreover, in this paper we employ three different parametric frontiers to 
estimate bank efficiencies, namely the stochastic translog, linear spline and Fourier-
flexible. In the banking literature the most common used frontier is the translog. 
However it has the drawback of being a local approximation which predicts average 
cost as a standard U-shaped quadratic curve (Greene, 1980). It is well accepted that 
due to the heterogeneous nature of banking technology, the global behaviour of the 
cost function is better analysed when global approximation estimation strategies are 
employed (see Mitchell and Onvural, 1996; Berger et al., 1997; and Altunbas et al., 
2001b).  McMallister and McManus (1993) and more recently Humphrey and Vale 
(2004) observe that compared to translog both the linear spline and the Fourier-
flexible functional form better fit the global properties of the cost function in banking 
as they predict an M-shaped average cost curve.  
The linear spline is a semi-parametric technique (Poirier, 1976) that 
approximates the unknown (minimising) cost function by a piecewise linear function. 
The Fourier-flexible function is also a semi-parametric technique (Gallant, 1981) that 
approximates the unknown cost function by a Fourier series. As a way of checking the 
robustness of our results this paper compares the stochastic translog, linear spline and 
Fourier-flexible cost frontier approaches.  
The translog cost function is a second-order Taylor series expansion of any 
twice-differentiable cost function at a given local point. For two outputs and three 
inputs, it can be written as follows (we have dropped the subscripts denoting bank i 
and year t for notational ease):  
 
                                                
13
 There is no consensus on which distributional assumption is the most appropriate to disentangle the 
composed error term in banking efficiency literature. Other distributional assumptions often employed 
are the truncated normal (Stevenson, 1980) and gamma distribution (Greene, 1990). 
14
 If the i-th bank is observed in the last period of the panel, T, then iiT uu = as the exponential 
function has value one when t=T. For earlier periods in the panel, the technical inefficiency effects are 
the product of the technical inefficiency effect for the i-th bank in the last period of the panel and the 
value of the exponential function which depends on the parameter n, and the number of period before 
the last period of the panel T-t. If n>0, then –n(t-T)>0 and exp[-n(t-T)]>1;thus  iit uu ≥ i.e. efficiency 
decreases with time, see Coelli et al. (1998 p. 204). 
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where TC is the normalised total cost including operating and financial costs; Q1 
and Q2 are output quantities, total loans and total securities, respectively (with one 
added to avoid problems with taking the natural logarithm of zero); P1 is the 
normalised price of labour; P2 is the normalised price of deposits; α, β, δ, γ, ρ are 
parameters to be estimated; and ε  is the two-components error term as defined above.  
The general form of linear Spline function is defined as follows: 
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where wiQ ,  are the i=1,2 outputs and w=1,…,7
15
 size-classes of banks with a 
separate linear spline line segment. One line segment is specified for each of the seven 
bank size-classes for each output subject to constrain that the segments join up 
continuously at the knots.
16
  
Finally, the Fourier-flexible function is defined as follows: 
                                                
15
 Following Humphrey and Vale (2004), in this study we use seven piecewise linear segments for each 
output.  
16
 The 1,iα represents the slope over the first interval for output i, and each of the remaining coefficient 
wi ,α  (w=2,…,7) represent the change in the slope from interval (w-1) to interval w, respectively. Knots 
are specified according to the percentiles of the output series.  
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The Fourier form is a global approximation since the respective trigonometric 
terms attached to the translog form are mutually orthogonal over the [0, 2 ]π  
interval.
17
  
In the translog part of each cost function we apply the common restrictions of 
standard symmetry ( jiijjiij γγδδ == and ) and of homogeneity in prices 
( 0,1
333
=== ∑∑∑
j
ij
i
ij
j
j ργβ  ) where i=1,2 and j=1,2,3. In accordance with the linear 
homogeneity in prices TC, P1 and P2 are normalised by the price of capital P3. We do 
not consider input share equations embodying Shephard’s Lemma restrictions in order 
to allow for the possibility of allocative inefficiency (Berger and Mester, 1997).   
In order to determine which of the functional forms better fits our data we carry 
out a set of structural tests and comparisons. First we use the likelihood-ratio to test if 
the translog cost function is an adequate representation of the data given the Fourier-
flexible cost specification. Then, we employ the Akaike information criterion to 
determine which of the three cost specifications is the most informative. The linear 
spline and the translog are not nested models; hence, the likelihood-ratio cannot be 
used.  With non-nested models, the ones with the largest number of parameters often 
have advantages over those with less number of parameters. However, this violates 
the parsimony principle that the model which has the least number of parameters is 
preferable. Therefore the benefit of the Akaike information criterion is that by 
                                                
17
 In order to reduce the problems arising near the end points we restrict iz - the ‘adjusted’ values of 
iQln - to span over [.1x2π , .9x2π ] interval (Gallant, 1981).  The formula for iz is 
)ln2(. iQa ×+×− µµπ where [a b] is the range of iQln and
)(
)21.29(.
ab −
×−×
=
ππ
µ . 
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penalising models with a large number of parameters it avoids the problem of 
choosing too often the less parsimonious one.  
Finally, we check whether the alternative cost functions as well as the various 
frontier modelling applied in this study satisfy the consistency conditions set out by 
Bauer et al. (1998). According to these authors, to ensure accuracy of results when 
comparing estimates derived from different methodologies it is important to check 
whether different cost specifications and frontiers modelling rank the institutions in 
approximately the same order. We employ the Spearman rank-order correlation 
coefficient that shows how close the ranking of banks among each of the six frontier 
specifications is.
18
 The ranking for each model is based on the average efficiency 
value for each bank over the six year period. Another condition is to make sure the 
different methods used identify mostly the same institutions as best practice and worst 
practice. Specifically, for each pair of frontier models we check if the 25% best 
(worst) practice banks identified by one model are also identified in the top (bottom) 
quarter by the other model.  
 
4. Results 
 
The likelihood-ratio test and Akaike information criterion are undertaken to 
check which functional form best fits our data and they indicate that the Fourier-
flexible should be preferred to the translog and linear spline specifications (see Table 
A3 in the Appendix for the tests results). In addition, Table A4 shows that the 
alternative cost functions and frontier models applied in this study generally satisfy 
the consistency conditions set out by Bauer et al. (1998).     
Table 3 illustrates the cost efficiency scores over the period 1998-2003 for the 
common European and the separate bank- and market-based frontiers by bank types 
and ownership based on the Fourier-flexible cost function.
19
 It reports our findings by 
country (grouped according to their financial structures). The alternative frontier 
                                                
18
 For each frontier modelling we derive efficiency scores based on the three alternative cost functions. 
The efficiency scores derived from the bank- and market-based frontiers are pooled in order to compare 
the ranking for the full sample of banks.  
19 As discussed in Section 3.1 our financial structure calculations allocate two traditionally bank-based 
countries, namely Greece and Spain, to the market-based group.  To account for the fact that this may 
be a temporary effect we calculate the cost efficiency estimates with and without the inclusion of these 
two countries in both the bank- and market based- groups. Unless it is reported, the results do not 
change significantly. 
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models identify the same best and worst practices banking sectors within the bank-
based financial system’s group. Indeed countries are ranked in the same order and 
overall the most cost efficient banking sectors are those of Italy (with efficiency 
scores of about 89%) and Denmark (with average scores of 84%); in contrast, 
Luxembourg and Ireland seem to present the lowest efficiency levels of around 
56%.
20
 The market-based estimations yield only slightly different results according to 
whether the cost efficiency scores are derived from the European common frontier or 
the separate market-based frontier. Nevertheless, in both cases the UK and Sweden 
seem to show relatively high average cost efficiency scores for commercial banks 
(over 75% on average). However, it also appears that in various countries the banking 
sector as a whole tends to be less efficient when savings and mutual banks are not 
included in the sample, as in the case of Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal.
21
 
Focusing on bank ownership, Table 3 confirms that commercial banks are found 
on average less cost efficient than savings banks in all countries except France, 
Sweden and the UK. In addition, with only one exception (namely Belgium) 
commercial banking institutions are significantly less cost efficient than co-operative 
banks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
20
 Results for Luxembourg are often found extreme in the literature. This could be due to the large 
proportion of foreign banks in the sample for this country.  
21
 Our total sample in each country was constrained by the requirement that the available observations 
in each bank type are sufficient to estimate separate country- and ownership-specific frontiers. 
Therefore, although for some countries saving or co-operative banks do exist they are not included in 
our sample.  
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Table 3 Fourier-Flexible Cost Efficiency Estimates: Common European versus Bank- and 
Market- Based Frontiers (1998-2003) 
 
 European Common Frontier 
 
Separate Bank- and Market- Based  Frontiers 
Country Commercial Savings Co-op All  Commercial Savings Co-op All 
         
Bank-based countries:                 
Austria  78.79% 83.60% 79.80% 80.73% 78.00% 82.82% 78.97% 79.93% 
Belgium  72.33% 78.23% 70.88% 73.81% 70.63% 79.09% 71.80% 73.84% 
Denmark  83.56% 86.02% n.a. 84.79% 81.64% 84.76% n.a. 83.20% 
France  80.89%
+
 78.08%
+
 80.42%
 +
 79.79% 80.52% 76.00% 81.35% 79.29% 
Germany  75.69%
 +
 79.01%
 +
 77.87%
+
 77.53% 75.21% 78.81% 77.41% 77.14% 
Ireland  54.38% n.a. n.a. 54.38% 57.63% n.a. n.a. 57.63% 
Italy  82.38% 94.31% 90.67% 89.12% 82.05% 93.84% 90.78% 88.89% 
Luxembourg  55.97% n.a. n.a. 55.97% 56.06% n.a. n.a. 56.06% 
Portugal  64.95% n.a. n.a. 64.95% 65.30% n.a. n.a. 65.30% 
          
Market-based countries:         
Greece  63.26% n.a. n.a. 63.26% 60.18% n.a. n.a. 60.18% 
Netherlands  57.43% n.a. n.a. 57.43% 60.61% n.a. n.a. 60.61% 
Spain  75.66% 79.84% 78.79% 78.10% 79.29%
+
 83.46%
+
 82.38%
+
 81.71% 
Sweden  80.06% 75.52% n.a. 77.79% 74.43%
++
 74.24%
++
 n.a. 74.34% 
UK  76.84% 57.99% n.a. 67.41% 82.18% 55.10% n.a. 68.64% 
         
Total (All banks) 71.59% 79.18% 79.74% 76.83% 71.61% 76.74% 81.22% 76.53% 
Notes:  
a. All figures are mean cost efficiencies for the period 1998-2003. Other descriptive statistics and year-by-year estimations 
are available from the authors upon request.  
b. The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests employed to check for the hypothesis H0 of equality of means cost efficiencies 
across ownership structure in each country. The 
+
,
++ 
denotes statistical insignificant at 1% and 10% significance level, 
respectively.  
c. “n.a.”= not available because that particular type of banking institution either does not exist in that particular country or 
there are not enough observations to estimate country- and ownership-specific frontier models. 
d. The translog and linear spline estimates are available from the authors upon request.  
e. Finland is dropped from our sample because we could not estimate the country-specific frontier due to low number of 
observations. 
 
To further investigate the ownership hypothesis we also test the relationship 
between commercial listed banks versus mutual banks. Figure 1 reports the average 
cost efficiencies estimated using the common EU frontier for the listed versus non-
listed banks in our sample for the year 2003.  
Results show that while commercial listed institutions appear more cost efficient 
than their non-listed counterparts, on the whole our results reject the agency theory 
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hypothesis that managers of privately-owned banks are more cost efficient than those 
of mutual banking institutions because of capital market devices. 
 
 
Figure 1: Cost efficiency of listed versus non-listed institutions by size, 2003 
Common European frontier, year 2003
72%
74%
76%
78%
80%
82%
84%
86%
Commercial Listed Commercial non-listed Co-operatives non-listed Savings non-listed
All size banks Large banks (assets>€210m)
 
Notes:  
The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests employed to check for the hypothesis H0 of equality of 
means cost efficiencies across listed and non-listed institutions. All the results are statistical different 
at 1%.  
 
In particular, we find that mutual banks operating in the EU-15 countries are 
significantly more cost efficient over the other bank types in our sample. As shown in 
Figure 1, these results are also confirmed for large banks only (assets > €210m that 
represents the first quartile of the total asset series) and, although not reported in the 
figure, for each of the years under study.  
Overall these results imply that the ownership structure hypothesis described in 
Section 1 is not supported by our empirical results. Our findings are in the line for 
example with Altunbas et al. (2003) who also find that on average commercial banks 
operating in Europe and the US are less cost efficient than their mutual counterparts 
over 1990-2000. One explanation for these results could be that the agency costs in 
mutual banks are to some extent limited due to their mainly retail and small 
customers’ business orientation (see Altunbas et al., 2001a). The managers of local 
banks are interested in establishing long-term relationships with their clients and 
promoting cost efficiency in order to signal the credibility and safety of their banking 
institutions (Rasmusen, 1988). However, the possibility that mutual co-operative and 
 20 
savings banks exert local monopoly power cannot be excluded since the lower cost of 
funding may imply that these institutions have market power in pricing their inputs 
and outputs. For instance, the savings and co-operative banks have the reputation of 
being safer as the deposit protection schemes operated in these banks are designed to 
reduce the bankruptcy risk; hence, depositors might be willing to accept a lower 
interest rate on their deposits in order to reduce the risk of bank insolvency.
22
 
Another aim of this paper is to test the financial structure hypothesis that posits 
that after controlling for the level of financial development financial structure does 
not have any independent effect on bank efficiency. In order to control for the fact 
that the inclusion of Greece and Spain in the market-based group may be just a 
temporary effect, we also calculate the cost efficiency estimates without the inclusion 
of these two countries in both the bank- and market-based groups.   
As shown in Figure 2, the estimates of the common European and separate 
bank- and market-based frontiers reveal that commercial banks operating in bank- and 
market-based economies have average efficiency scores of just above 70%; and 
according to the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test the differences in average 
efficiency level are not significant at the 5% level. The same holds true when we 
exclude Greece and Spain from the market-based group, although these results are not 
reported here. Looking at the average results for savings banks in Figure 2, the 
estimates show that market-based savings banks are about 12% less cost efficient than 
bank-based ones. The same hold true when we exclude Greece and Spain from the 
market-based group; however, in this case the average of the overall market-based 
savings banks sector drops by 6.5%, from 71.12% to 66.76%. Finally, the co-
operative banking sector shows similar efficiency scores (around 80%) in bank- and 
market-based countries; however we need to interpret this with caution, as only the 
Spanish banks comprise our market-based co-operative sample. 
These results suggest that at least for the commercial banking sector the 
financial structure hypothesis holds (see Levine 1997 and La Porta et al. 1998’s view, 
and later confirmed by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001). Nonetheless, the 
estimates clearly show that market-based savings banks are significantly less cost 
efficient than bank-based ones.   
                                                
22
 For instance, until May 2002 savings banks in Germany enjoyed the support of government or local 
authorities. The European Commission has also begun investigations in Austria into whether the state 
guarantee for the regional mortgage banks and certain savings banks would qualify as illegal state aid 
(see European Central Bank, 2002).   
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Figure 2 Average cost X-efficiency by financial structure for commercial, savings 
and co-operative banks (1998-2003)
a,b 
 
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
Commercial Banks Saving Banks Co-operative Banks
Bank-based countries (common European frontier)
Market-based countries (common European frontier)
Bank-based countries (bank-based frontier)
Market-based countries (market-based frontier)
 
Notes:   
a. The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was employed to check for the hypothesis H0 of equality 
of means cost efficiencies across financial systems in each ownership structure. The results for all 
frontier models are significant at the 1% level within the savings sector; whereas the null hypothesis 
is accepted at least at the 5% level for the commercial and co-operative banks’ sector.      
b. The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test was employed to check for the hypothesis H0 of equality 
of means cost efficiencies across ownership structures in each financial system. The results for all 
frontier models are significant at the 1% level within the bank-based countries; whereas the null 
hypothesis is accepted at 10% level within the market-based countries.  
 
This mixed evidence can be explained by the fact that the prevailing corporate 
governance mechanisms in bank-based financial systems, such as the reputation 
factor, may force managers in these economies to be more cost efficiency disciplined. 
Typically savings and co-operative banks are regionally restricted and therefore do 
not compete against one another, e.g. savings banks do not compete against savings 
banks but compete against commercial and co-operative banks; similarly, co-
operative banks do not compete against other co-operative banks but do compete 
against savings and commercial banks. This, on the one hand, may encourage them to 
be less efficient, but on the other hand they have strong incentives to maintain their 
brand and reputation in their own particular region or local markets.  
In contrast, the corporate governance mechanisms in market-based economies 
such as takeover threats and managerial compensation schemes do not have the same 
power in threatening the managers of savings and co-operative banks  (see Caprio and 
Levine, 2002; and Levine, 2003, for a description of the problems of governing banks 
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and Tadesse, 2002; Levine, 2002 Beck and Levine, 2002 on how the effectiveness of 
the financial structure depends on the strength of the contractual environments and 
agency costs in each economy).  
Therefore, we provide some evidence that differences in cost efficiency across 
financial systems can be explained by bank type specific characteristics. This 
evidence can be useful to policy-makers who are interested in designing corporate 
governance principles at international level, as they need to take into consideration the 
special features of each institutional structure of the banking system (see also 
Altunbas and Chakravarty, 1998).
23
  
It is also meaningful to compare cost efficiencies across different bank types 
within each financial structure. This comparison provides useful insights for any 
potential links between bank efficiency, financial structure and bank types. We focus 
only on commercial and savings banks, as only the Spanish banks comprise our 
market-based co-operative sample. Figure 2 shows that on average bank-based 
savings banks are significantly more efficient than their commercial counterparts. In 
contrast, the alternative common frontiers show that market-based commercial and 
savings banks have similar average cost efficiency (around 71%). However, when we 
exclude Greece and Spain from the market-based sample we find that the market-
based commercial banks are more cost efficient than savings banks (by more than 
4.6% points).    
On one hand, the fact that commercial banks are less efficient than mutual banks 
in bank-based economies might be evidence of lower agency costs in savings banks 
due to their business orientation or local monopoly power. However, it is also possible 
that the commercial sector includes all the recently converted mutual banks in bank-
based economies and that they may have not yet realised the full benefits of 
conversion.
24
 On the other hand, the complementary effect between bank and stock 
market development can explain why on average commercial banks are found to have 
the same (or greater) efficiency levels compared with savings within market-based 
economies. With high stock market development there is a lot of available 
                                                
23 It is also worth mentioning that any inference based on the savings banks of market-based economies 
should be treated with caution since the number of market-based countries with an active savings 
sectors is relatively small compared to the bank-based economies.  
24
 See Ruozi and Anderloni (1999) for a description of differences in banks’ privatisation process 
across European countries.   
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information on stock-traded firms that help banks evaluate better their credit risk and 
thus reduce the risk of loan default. 
Overall our analysis suggests that differences in cost efficiency across bank 
types can be explained by the prevailing financial system in each economy. This 
evidence illustrates the national diversity of corporate governance systems in Europe 
and can be of importance for the policy-makers who are concerned with the full 
integration of the European financial system. This is in line with Cernat (2004) who 
demonstrates that the poor EU decision-making procedures and the diversity of 
national corporate governance models across Europe are the two major constraints on 
the convergence of a harmonised corporate governance model in Europe. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper seeks to extend the established literature on efficiency in banking 
organisations by providing European cross-country evidence on the relative efficiency 
across ownership, bank type and financial structures. In particular, we estimate the 
cost X-efficiency levels for a large sample of commercial, savings and co-operative 
banking institutions over 1998-2003 by employing alternative parametric frontiers 
across bank- and market-based EU-15 countries classified using the World Bank 
Financial Structure Database (see Beck et al., 2001 and Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 
2001).  
The paper shows that, in line with previous literature, the Fourier-flexible is 
clearly preferable over the linear spline and the translog cost specifications. Moreover, 
it seems that despite the tremendous efforts that have been made in European banking 
with respect to deregulation, liberalisation and harmonisation of the regulatory 
framework there are still considerable cost efficiency differences across alternative 
bank types, ownership and financial structures. The various frontier models tested in 
this paper provide evidence of cost inefficiencies of around 23%; hence, there are still 
significant cost savings that can be obtained by eliminating managerial inefficiencies 
across the European banking systems. 
Most importantly, while non-listed commercial institutions appear less cost 
efficient than the listed ones, on the whole our results reject the agency theory 
hypothesis that managers of privately-owned banks are more cost efficient than those 
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of mutual banking institutions because of capital market devices. In particular, we 
find that mutual banks operating in the EU-15 countries are significantly more cost 
efficient over the other bank types included in our sample. Furthermore, results are 
mixed concerning the financial structure hypothesis that in developed financial 
systems bank efficiency should not be statistically different across bank- versus 
market-based economies. Specifically, we find that while the hypothesis seems to 
hold for the sub-sample of commercial banks, in bank-based countries savings banks 
appear to have significant cost efficiency advantages over those operating in market-
based countries and over commercial banks. Finally, there is some evidence that in 
market-based economies, commercial and savings banks have similar average cost 
efficiency scores; however, this relationship is not confirmed when we exclude Spain 
and Greece from the market-based sample so it needs further empirical testing. 
There are three main policy implications arising from this paper. First it is 
possible that the cost savings from bank demutualisation can be realised only in the 
medium/long run; hence, this study could give important indications to policy-makers 
in the context of banking markets restructuring and the effects of demutualisation of 
non-private banking institutions. Second, it is clear that bank type characteristics have 
an important role in explaining the differences in cost efficiency across financial 
systems, an issue that should be of fundamental importance to policy-makers who are 
interested in the corporate governance principles at the international level (e.g. the 
Basel Committee). Finally, the national diversity of corporate governance systems 
seems to be a major constraint on the convergence to a single corporate governance 
system in Europe, an issue that will likely affect the progress towards the full 
integration of the European financial sector. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Variable Description  
 
Variable Symbol Description 
Total Cost TC Personnel Expenses + Interest Expenses + Other 
Administrative Expenses 
Output 1 Q1 Total Customer Loans 
Output 2 Q2 Total Other Earning Assets 
Input price 1 P1 Personnel Expenses/Total Assets 
Input price 2 P2 Interest Expenses/Total Deposits 
Input price 3
 a
 P3 Other Administrative Expenses/Total Fixed Assets 
a
 For Greek banks we replaced the item ‘Other Administrative Expenses’ for ‘Other Operating Expenses’ due to 
missing data. 
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Table A2 Country classification of Financial Structure and Development based on a sample of 54 
countries (1998-2003) 
Notes:  
a. Financial Structure Index is the means-removed average of relative ‘size’, ‘activity’ and ‘efficiency’ measures. Relative ‘size’ is defined as the ratio of the stock 
market capitalisation to total assets of deposit money banks; the relative ‘activity’ is defined as the ratio of total value of stocks traded divided by bank credit to the 
private sector; and relative ‘efficiency’ is defined as the product of total value of stocks traded and the ratio of average overhead cost to total assets of banks in the 
country. Countries with values of Financial Structure Index above (below) the sample mean are classified as market-based (bank-based). A financial system is 
characterised as underdeveloped when both bank credit to the private sector/GDP and the total value of the stock traded/GDP are below the sample mean.    
b. The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis tests were employed to check for the hypothesis H0 of equality of means Structure indexes across financial systems. The null 
hypotheses have been rejected at 1% significance level.    
Source: World Bank Financial Structure database, http://www.worldbank.org. Beck et al. (2001) describe the sources, the construction and the intuitions behind all the 
variables used for the financial structure and development index.   
Financial Developed economies Financial Underdeveloped economies 
Country Name 
Relative 
Size 
Relative 
Activity  
Relative 
Efficiency Structure Country Name 
Relative 
Size 
Relative 
Activity  
Relative 
Efficiency Structure 
Bank-based economies Bank-based economies 
Austria -0.869 -0.646 -0.014 -0.510 Czech Republic -0.659 -0.514 -0.013 -0.396 
Portugal -0.643 -0.502 -0.010 -0.385 Colombia -0.429 -0.660 -0.015 -0.368 
New Zealand -0.593 -0.539 -0.013 -0.382 Poland -0.581 -0.486 -0.014 -0.360 
Belgium -0.418 -0.465 -0.011 -0.298 Mexico -0.473 -0.333 -0.011 -0.273 
Germany -0.630 -0.243 0.004 -0.290 Estonia -0.294 -0.472 -0.013 -0.260 
Japan -0.512 -0.312 -0.006 -0.277 Peru -0.164 -0.578 -0.014 -0.252 
Israel -0.443 -0.370 -0.009 -0.274 Moldova -0.075 -0.489 -0.014 -0.193 
Cyprus -0.411 -0.352 -0.004 -0.256 Brazil -0.223 -0.190 -0.005 -0.139 
Denmark -0.457 -0.283 -0.001 -0.247 Hungary -0.381 -0.026 -0.006 -0.137 
Norway -0.489 -0.243 -0.005 -0.246 Philippines 0.039 -0.419 -0.012 -0.131 
Ireland -0.354 -0.364 -0.012 -0.244 Kuwait -0.306 -0.046 -0.012 -0.121 
Iceland -0.350 -0.358 -0.009 -0.239 Botswana 0.319 -0.621 -0.015 -0.106 
Jordan -0.099 -0.524 -0.013 -0.212 Jamaica 0.358 -0.633 -0.015 -0.097 
Italy -0.430 -0.003 0.007 -0.142 Barbados 0.365 -0.561 -0.013 -0.070 
Luxembourg 0.320 -0.662 -0.015 -0.119 Chile 0.387 -0.573 -0.013 -0.066 
France -0.203 0.047 0.009 -0.049 Argentina 0.481 -0.558 -0.013 -0.030 
     Trinidad and Tobago 0.620 -0.621 -0.015 -0.005 
     Saudi Arabia -0.140 0.149 -0.012 -0.001 
Cat. Av. -0.411 -0.364 -0.007 -0.260 Cat. Av. -0.064 -0.424 -0.013 -0.167 
Market-based economies Market-based economies 
Australia 0.081 -0.001 -0.002 0.026 Pakistan -0.667 1.046 -0.004 0.125 
Malaysia 0.334 -0.238 -0.009 0.029 Zimbabwe 1.114 -0.173 -0.008 0.311 
Greece -0.099 0.327 0.003 0.077 El Salvador 1.946 -0.655 -0.016 0.425 
Netherlands -0.115 0.343 0.017 0.081      
Singapore 0.176 0.103 -0.003 0.092 Cat. Av. 0.798 0.073 -0.009 0.287 
Spain -0.373 0.742 0.028 0.132      
United Kingdom 0.239 0.255 0.027 0.174      
Canada 0.327 0.255 0.010 0.197      
Korea, Rep. -0.444 1.128 0.016 0.233      
India -0.292 1.447 -0.002 0.384      
Switzerland 0.450 0.622 0.086 0.386      
Hong Kong 0.832 0.309 0.037 0.393      
South Africa 1.076 0.152 0.029 0.419      
Sweden 0.553 0.976 0.011 0.513      
Turkey -0.200 2.343 0.020 0.721      
Finland 1.673 1.401 0.019 1.031      
United States 1.126 3.070 0.070 1.422      
Cat. Av. 0.314 0.778 0.021 0.371      
Developed econ. -0.037 0.225 0.008 0.065 Underdeveloped econ. 0.059 -0.353 -0.012 -0.102 
Overall mean 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
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Table A3 Structural tests: Likelihood-ratio and Akaike Information Criterion  
 
 
H0: Translog form versus H1: 
Fourier-flexible Translog Spline 
Fourier 
Flexible 
Max [AICi] 
 
LR-Test 
Statistics 
a
 
(Critical 
value X
2
0.01) 
Outcome AIC
b
 AIC
b
 AIC
b
 Outcome 
European 
frontier 
1226.48 
(29.14) 
do not 
accept 
9607.27 8458.73 10206.51 
Fourier-
flexible 
Bank-
based 
frontier 
1296.39 
(29.14) 
do not 
accept 
10918.78 10067.69 11552.97 
Fourier-
flexible 
Market-
based 
frontier 
155.24 
(29.14) 
do not 
accept 
90.07 44.89 153.69 
Fourier-
flexible 
 
Notes:  
a. Likelihood-ratio tests H0: Translog form versus H1: Fourier-flexible form. The likelihood ratio statistic, 
LR, is calculated as -2{ln[L(H0)]-ln[L(H1)]} where L(H0) and L(H1) are the values of the likelihood 
function under the null and alternative hypotheses, H0  and H1,respectively. The critical values of X
2
0.01 
with 14 degrees of freedom are presented in parenthesis.  
b. We define the Akaike information criterion as AICi=ln[L(Hi)]-ki, where i=translog, linear spline and 
Fourier-flexible cost function specification and ki is the number of parameters in each model. The model 
that maximises AICi is the most informative model. 
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Table A4 Bauer et al.’s (1998) Consistency Conditions 
 
Condition 1: Spearman rank-order correlations among the efficiency scores estimated by the alternative frontier models 
 EU-T EU-S EU-F MB&BB-T MB&BB-S MB&BB-F 
EU-T 1.000 0.893 0.970 0.208 0.193 0.179 
EU-S  1.000 0.875 0.201 0.189 0.172 
EU-F   1.000 0.200 0.184 0.177 
MB&BB-T    1.000 0.891 0.939 
MB&BB-S     1.000 0.899 
MB&BB-F      1.000 
Condition 2: Correspondence of “Best Practice” and “Worst Practice” banks across the various frontier models 
EU-T  0.847 0.932 0.888 0.770 0.868 
EU-S 0.827  0.822 0.806 0.871 0.807 
EU-F 0.921 0.810  0.859 0.761 0.912 
MB&BB-T 0.886 0.783 0.856  0.807 0.866 
MB&BB-S 0.820 0.863 0.816 0.820  0.819 
MB&BB-F 0.896 0.793 0.915 0.871 0.849  
Notes:  
Condition 1: According to Bauer et al. (1998) in order to reduce the effects of noise, the rank-order 
correlations are based on the average efficiency value for each bank over the six year period. All the 
Spearman rank-order correlations are statistical significant at 1% level using two-sided t-test.  
Condition 2: Each number in the upper (lower) triangle depicts the proportion of banks that are 
identified by one model as having efficiency scores in the 25% of the most (least) efficient banks that 
are also identified in the most (least) efficient 25% by the other model. In all cases the correspondence 
is statistically greater than 0.250 at the 5% and 1% using an asymptotic Normal test for proportions in 
ordered data. Under the null hypothesis of the independence of the two categorisations, the number of 
banks in the top 25% of both has a hypergeometric distribution. Exact p-values can be obtained using 
Fisher’s test but given the large number of observations, these p-values are well approximated by using 
a normal distribution. 
 
EU-T = European frontier based on the translog cost function; EU-S = European frontier based on the 
linear spline cost function; EU-F = European frontier based on the Fourier-flexible cost function; 
MB&BB-T = market-based and bank-based frontiers based on the translog cost function.; MB&BB-S = 
market-based and bank-based frontiers based on the linear spline cost function; MB&BB-F = market-
based and bank-based frontiers based on the Fourier-flexible cost function.  
  
 
